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Tracing Contacts
to Control the COVID-19 Pandemic
Christoph, Michael and Daniel Günther
Abstract—The control of the COVID-19 pandemic requires a
considerable reduction of contacts mostly achieved by imposing
movement control up to the level of enforced quarantine. This has
lead to a collapse of substantial parts of the economy. Carriers
of the disease are infectious roughly 3 days after exposure to the
virus. First symptoms occur later or not at all. As a consequence
tracing the contacts of people identified as carriers is essential for
controlling the pandemic. This tracing must work everywhere,
in particular indoors, where people are closest to each other.
Furthermore, it should respect people’s privacy. The present
paper presents a method to enable a thorough traceability with
very little risk on privacy. In our opinion, the latter capabilities
are necessary to control the pandemic during a future relaunch
of our economy.
Index Terms—COVID-19, corona, tracing contacts, privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
T
HE COVID-19 pandemic has spread all over the world.
It has already lead to a very large number of fatalities,
more than 40’000 as of end of March 2020. The first priority
of humanity is to take all possible actions to prevent more
people from dying. In some places, this lead to enforcing a
quarantine on large portions of the population. The economic
damage is substantial. The US alone is investing USD 2’000
Billions to alleviate the consequences of the pandemic. Thus,
limiting the economical damage by restarting the economy as
soon as possible, while at the same time protecting people,
is of immense importance. The present document aims at
contributing specific suggestions on how to achieve this.
Three important properties of the COVID-19 pandemic are
that
• The sickness is limited to roughly three weeks in time.
After this period, people are either healthy again, hope-
fully without impairments, or dead. All evidence ex-
pressed publicly, so far, indicates that former carriers of
the disease are not contagious anymore after that time. A
strictly observed quarantine of three weeks has thus the
potential to basically eliminate all carriers of the disease.
A quarantine is never perfect, e.g. due to the need to
restock food supplies. As a consequence some chains of
infection will persist.
• The spreading of the disease in the population is char-
acterized by an exponential growth. The characteristic
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parameter R0, which describes the number of people
infected by a single carrier, is estimated to be around
2-2.3. Any value above 1 leads to a exponential growth,
as long as there is no substantial immunity. More detailed
epidemiological models are more differentiated but show
a similar threshold behavior[1]. The value of R0, men-
tioned above is determined by the period during which
a carrier is contagious, the probability of transmitting
the disease, and the number of contacts that the carrier
had during that time. There is no means to control the
first factor. The second may be somewhat influenced by
carrying masks but not to a level considered sufficient.
Thus, the most important option for controlling R0 is to
reduce the contacts between carriers and other citizens.
• The diagnoses of sick people is a critical element. Some
people do not show symptoms that they associate with
the sickness but are nevertheless infectious. They may be
a cause for requiring a longer quarantine than described
above. In addition and most importantly, no one shows
symptoms before being infectious, which means that as
long as there are no tests that everyone can apply at
regular intervals, there will always be a delay before the
spreading by a particular individual can be discontinued.
Furthermore, extensive testing as practiced and further
expanded in Germany will be most effective if the most
likely carriers are being tested.
Currently, there is a variety of attempts to contain the pan-
demic, which should all be followed in parallel. The de-
velopment of vaccines and of medications are essential but
may not be available in the near future. This has led to an
enforced reduction of contacts by various levels of quarantine.
The concept of achieving immunity by letting the epidemic
spread have rightfully been abandoned, due to the heavy toll
in human lives. Bill Gates formulates what most of us think
“But bringing the economy back ... that’s more of a reversible
thing than bringing people back to life. So we’re going to take
the pain in the economic dimension — huge pain — in order
to minimize the pain in the diseases-and-death dimension.”1
The “how” of restarting the economy remains. Some authors
studied the effect of relaxing the quarantine at the cost of a
regrowth of infected people before shutting down again [2].
This leads to an increasing level of immunity in a series
of waves. In view of the small percentage of people that
are immunized at each step and in view of the risk of an
unmanageable growth, the number of waves needs to be
1https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/25/what-bill-gates-would-do-to-fight-
covid-19-if-he-were-us-president.html
2substantial. Furthermore, each wave costs lives. China, South
Korea and to a much smaller scale Webasto in Germany have
shown an alternative, which consists in a careful tracing of
contacts, associated with testing, and quarantining positively
tested people. We will call these people “carriers” throughout
the paper.
II. TRACING CONTACTS
Tracing contacts is a rather natural concept for containing
the pandemic. It aims at identifying and subsequently isolating
people, who might potentially be carriers. Since the incubation
time until an infected person becomes infectious herself is
around 3 days and since first symptoms only occur after 5
days at the earliest, with a diagnosis available at en even later
time, there is a lag during which infectious carriers continue
spreading the disease. Thus, knowing contacts to people who
have been identified as carriers, allows isolating unidentified
potential carriers. The frequent absence of clear symptoms is
a second critical cause for the spreading of the infection. In
this case contact tracing allows identifying carriers without
symptoms through their contact to people with symptoms.
In that case, the carrier with symptoms is not the originator
but rather helps discovering the originator. Independent on
who is the originator, contact tracing and subsequent isolation
eliminates sources of disease spreading. An immediate testing
and determination of contacts allows to identify further contact
whenever the outcome of the test was positive. In the case of a
negative outcome, testing is repeated after an incubation time,
with isolation being lifted in the case of a second negative
outcome.
At my institute (160 people), we traced a number of contacts
and noticed that the complexity of a manual process becomes
quickly unmanageable. Due to the exponential character of the
network of relations, there are simply too many contacts to be
traced. We ended up isolating everyone first at the Institute
level, shortly after that and independently of us at DLR level
and finally at national level. This observed complexity led
us to the conclusion that automatic means of tracing are
essential. Raskar et al. [3] have analyzed an approach based on
locating people with a particular focus on privacy-protection
and self-protection against the disease. We follow a somewhat
different approach. It is primarily based on contacts, rather
than on locations, although locations may be used in addition.
Furthermore, it is focusing on the control of the pandemic as
a whole. The protection of the individual turns out to reach a
similar level as in the approach by Raskar et al. [3].
The present exposition is developed against the background
of German regulations. The public authorities responsible for
health is the “Gesundheitsamt.” The Gesundheitsämter (many
of them, distributed all over the country) register every person
affected by the pandemic and organize the testing of people.
Thus the identity of any person which either has symptoms,
is tested positively or is affected by the disease is currently
known to the local Gesundheitsamt. We shall subsequently
just speak of the Gesundheitsamt as if it was a single entity.
That Gesundheitsamt is a trusted authority independent of
any use of electronic means to trace contacts. It shall thus
also be the trusted authority in our approach, which will be
responsible to operate the server needed to manage the list of
carriers. They do furthermore manage people in quarantine,
who have to follow strict rules in Germany. Not doing so may
lead to fines and imprisonment [4]. Additionally, Germany has
imposed limitations on the movement of people, which should
not be confused with the stricter quarantine. In our view, it
should be acceptable that regaining new degrees of freedom
may be associated with certain restrictions, which ensure
the traceability of contacts, without unduly exposing privacy.
Recent polls in Germany show a high level of acceptance of
restrictions to combat the pandemic. It may well be acceptable
to enforce the use of tracing, although this is not the focus of
the paper.
III. TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION
The precondition for traceability is to use of a smartphone
running a COVID-19 tracing app (the app) or alternatively
the use of a low cost device. For simplicity, the focus of the
exposition will be on an app running on a smartphone. Every
person leaving their home shall be requested to carry such a
device, with the app installed and active. This might be an
expectation, which people are free to follow or not. Whatever
solution is preferred is a political decision. The main elements
of its implementation are
• The automated creation of a list of contact instances
my_ctc, maintained in the personal device of the user.
The number of such entries could be up to a few thousand
entries per day as soon as big events take place again.
• The maintenance of a list of infectious carrier of the
disease ga_icd on the server of the Gesundheitsamt,
currently around 70’000 entries in total with a growth
rate of less than 4000 per day.
• The search for entries from the personal list my_ctc in
the list ga_icd retrieved from the Gesundheitsamt.
• In the case of a hit, the app informs the server of the
Gesundheitsamt about the identifier found.
• The server and the app cooperate in classifying the
category of the contact (Category 1 or 2, see below).
The associated contact persons might be involved in this
classification process.
• Based on the result, the Gesundheitsamt decides about
the quarantining and testing of the device’s owner.
The best possible cooperation of the contacts and the Gesund-
heitsamt in assessing the category of the contact reduces both
the test load and the necessity of a quarantine. In an initial
phase, this may include the indication of the seat used on
a joint train ride, the confirmation of a joint lunch or the
like. Clearly, further technical developments in sensing of both
the mutual placement and orientation of people will be of
great help in automating this process but are not needed in an
initial phase. Such developments could follow similar lines as
the work for indoor position, which achieves high levels of
accuracy [5].
3A. Actors
The above description identified a number of actors. Before
entering into this discussion, it is useful to differentiate three
categories of contacts [6]:
• Category 1 contacts are those to which a face-to-face
contact accumulated to more than 15 minutes.
• Category 2 contacts are those to which a face-to-face
contact accumulated to less than 15 minutes.
• Uncritical contacts are all others.
The consequences of being a Category 1 or 2 contact are
defined by the Gesundheitsamt and may be changed over time.
Both categories are quarantined. Currently, the main difference
is in the level of testing. The Category 2 defines the sampling
time of our contact monitoring.
With this preparation,we have the following actors:
• The Gesundheitsamt (trusted authority): it tests people for
COVID-19 infection, it publishes an anonymized list of
carriers and it facilitates the categorization of contacts.
• Roaming users: their devices monitor contacts at regular
intervals (30 second) and store the list of contacts my_ctc
as well a a list with location and orientation information
my_loc, their devices check whether there was a contact
to an infected person (at least once per day), and provide
support to the categorization of the contacts, potentially
using location and orientation information. Note that
all information is kept locally with the exception of
information exchanged in the categorization of a contact.
• Users tested positively: their devices provide their lists
my_ctc as far back as their owner’s infection may have
been contagious to the Gesundheitsamt, they go into treat-
ment or at least quarantine, and cooperate in determining
the category of contacts that they had. The device uses
the list my_loc to support the classification of contacts to
other people. Although the position information is kept
locally, it is partially disclosed to the Gesundheitsamt in
the assessment of contacts’ categories.
• Users with a critical contact (Category 1 or 2): they also
go into quarantine and are subject to an immediate test.
In the case of a positive outcome, they change category.
Otherwise, they are tested again after an incubation
time. In a second negative testing, they are freed from
quarantine obligations.
B. Tracing Method
There is a number of options to detect the proximity of
people. We propose to use Bluetooth transceivers to send
beacons and monitor for such beacons at regular intervals.
The benefit of using Bluetooth is that corresponding inter-
faces are included in nearly every smartphone and that they
are furthermore available on cheap platforms. In addition,
Bluetooth creates a direct relationship between the potential
contact persons, which works everywhere, including shopping
malls or the underground metro station. Although not too
reliable, the power level can be used as an indication of
the distance between the transmitter and the receiver, and
could thus be used as a filter. The details of this aspect
need further assessment. Furthermore, the use of Bluetooth
is associated with a low power consumption. The proposal
made in Section V uses functions available in the Application
Programming Interfaces (API) of Android and Apple iOS.
More refined solutions may be implemented by Google and
Apple, themselves providing improved power management,
relative contact positioning, safety against manipulation and
the like.
Tracing may either be performed on a voluntary basis or
enforced. The knowledge of being a carrier (positive testing)
does not provide benefits to people without or with marginal
symptoms. It rather puts them into quarantine and thus reduces
their freedom of movement. Quarantining carriers has a huge
benefit for society, however. Thus, the incentives to individuals
are purely ethical, which seems to be sufficient at the time.
Thus, we focus on the voluntary approach but provide some
hints for enforcement as well.
• In a preparatory phase, the user installs the tracing app.
In the case of enforcement, the app creates a connection
of data from an official ID-card and the device and
then registers the user with that data. This creates a
permission to roam and is communicated to the mobile
operator. It can furthermore be used to prevent a number
of manipulations to evade quarantining, for example. In
the case of a voluntary roll out, this registration does not
exist, and even in the mandatory case, it is only used to
prevent manipulations and does in particular not create
any additional means of tracking.
• Every day, the app chooses a random daily identifier
my_rdi, which it broadcasts at regular intervals using
a Bluetooth protocol (see Section V). The identifier
provided by the device is C0F1D19|my_dri. The random-
ness of the my_rdi prevents any correspondence with a
particular device or user. It is changed daily to prevent
tracking by any fixed monitoring stations.
• In parallel, the device searches for the beacons of other
devices. This monitoring is performed every 30 seconds.
Whenever the device detects an identifier of the form
C0F1D19|fg_dri for the first time, it adds fg_dri to its list
my_ctc and stores the current time (in 30 second units).
If it sees the identifier again, it updates the duration of
the contact. In total, there are 720 two-minutes intervals
in 24 hours. Assuming that someone is surrounded by
up to 6 people during 12 hours would lead us to 2160
entries. There is no difficulty in storing that number, but
this exposes the importance of applying simple filtering
to control the complexity of later processing steps.
• Whenever the Gesundheitsamt updates its list ga_ctc,
which is signed using its private key, the device checks
for matches between ga_ctc and my_ctc. The increase
in carriers is around 4000 per day in Germany. The
list shall include these entries as well as those of the
day before, which is perfectly manageable. The random
device identifier and the date must both match, since the
identifier is changed every day. Note that a very high level
of anonymity is preserved up to this point.
• If there are matches in the device’s list my_ctc and in the
list of the Gesundheitsamt ga_ctc, there are two different
4options:
– The devices notifies its owner and asks him about his
preferences. If the preference is to enter quarantine
without further checking, no further action is needed
and no information is ever exchanged.
– In all other cases, the Gesundheitsamt and the device
aim at categorizing the contact. This requires a
negotiation, which can be handled by a mailbox to
prevent the disclosure of the person’s identity. In
advanced negotiations, the information from my_loc
will typically be used in the process of categoriza-
tion.
• Once the category of a contact is determined, the Gesund-
heitsamt either asks the person to quarantines herself and
organizes testing, or just drops the alert if the contact was
uncritical. In the latter case, no further data is exchanged
and the data associated with the inquiry is erased.
• In the case of a critical contact, the Gesundheitsamt
invites the person for testing. All exchanges can again be
handled through a mailbox. This does again not require
the disclosure of the identity of the person. If the testing
is twice negative, the person leaves the quarantine and
the data is erased.
• In the case of a positive testing, the app provides the con-
tact history my_ctc from the beginning of the estimated
infection period to the Gesundheitsamt. The disclosure
of the identity of the person is not needed for pandemic
control. The app maintains the list of locations from the
estimated infection onward in order to respond to further
inquiries from the Gesundheitsamt.
• The device continues comparing its list my_ctc with
later provisions of ga_ctc. This is necessary, due to the
significant delay before some carriers are found and since
it is the last contact, which is determining the end of the
quarantine period.
• Whenever the Gesundheitsamt receives a list of my_ctc
including the timing and the duration, it will add the
random identifiers to its list ga_ctc. Depending on the
evolution of the pandemic and future experience, it may
decide to only trace contacts to Category 1 or to both
categories. It will add these contacts to its list and
publish a signed copy of ga_ctc at regular intervals. As
a consequence, listed identifiers will trigger an inquiry
of the associated devices with the Gesundheitsamt to ask
for categorization. Once every user device has performed
its matching, there will be no unidentified hits in the
past. Thus, the Gesundheitsamt can erase all non-public
information associated with the published list. Since some
devices may not have contact to the Gesundheitsamt for a
few hours, there should be a margin in erasing this data,
e.g. one extra day.
C. Tracking
From an epidemiological perspective, users that are quar-
antined would ideally be tracked. The procedure is straight
forward: whoever leaves the location of the quarantine is
warned. In the case of a continued breach of rules, the
Gesundheitsamt is informed and takes action. From this time
onward, the person could be continuously tracked to support
her repatriation into her quarantine zone. This is certainly
controversial and not too compatible with a voluntary tracing.
It may be activated if enforcement of tracing turns out to be
necessary. Currently, this seems not to be the case.
IV. THREATS
The tracing described above is meant to control the pan-
demic and to enable a restart of the economy, while keeping
citizens as protected as possible. In the case of a voluntary
use of the system, the main threats are attacks on the privacy
of users. They are not only serious but may additionally
jeopardize the acceptance of tracing as a method to control
the pandemic. In the case of enforced tracing, there are
additionally options for evading tracing or tracking. This is
mentioned but not discussed in any depth.
A. Attacking Privacy and other Misuses
The primary line of attack to access the personal profile of
a particular person is through the app. Thus, the app needs
a thoughtful design and implementation. This is, however, a
requirement, which it shares with any other software using
personal data and localization. A similar statement holds for
the software run on the server of the Gesundheitsamt. It should
avoid any deficiencies but is still exposed to exploits of the
operating systems and the like. We also assume that the public
key cryptosystem is secure in the relevant time. The data
base of the Gesundheitsamt is only of limited interest, since
it contains very little information and since the data is not
personalized. The bigger threat is the impersonation of the
Gesundheitsamt, it may lead to a number of options, which
mostly don’t have a clear benefit, like
• The removal or addition of contacts.
• The false categorization of contacts.
• The undue convocation of people to testing.
• The quarantining of healthy people.
The most influential possibility is to add a carrier to ga_ctc and
to thus retrieve the list of his contacts. This, however, requires
finding a valid random daily identifier, e.g. by creating an
explicit contact to a person as well as a major software bug
at the Gesundheitsamt e.g. by exposing its private key. Other
sophisticated attacks are conceivable, e.g. using a network of
cooperating Bluetooth units to profile users by tracking their
passage near those units. This is not particular to the present
system, however. Otherwise, we did not find an obvious other
critical attack so far. In the end the usefulness of tracing
carriers of COVID-19 and of restoring normality to our daily
life have to be balanced against fears of potential attacks.
B. Escaping Control
The consequence of having been in contact with an infected
fellow citizen is to become quarantined. Some people may
want to avoid that, even in the case of enforcement. Most
options such as roaming without an active device, breaking
quarantine rules, using different devices, uninstalling and
5reinstalling the app or cheating during the categorization can
all be handled by appropriate measures. They will have to be
addressed if enforcement is really desired. This is currently
not the case.
V. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
An implementation of the above system could easily be
performed by the companies Google for Android devices and
Apple for iOS devices. A more detailed design will need
a further specifications of the protocols, which should be
done jointly to achieve the fastest possible availability of a
fully inter-operable system. We studied different mechanisms
provided by Bluetooth in Application Programming Interfaces
(API). iBeacons, which is a protocol used for indoor location
services, became our initial candidate. This protocol allows
devices to broadcast identifiers, which are received by other
devices in the neighborhood. The received signal strength
can be used as an indicator of the transmitter to receiver
distance. The concentration of transmission and monitoring
around 30 seconds intervals of the time of the day can be
used to implement a simple form of power management.
The focus of our testing was on verifying the possibility
of using a mechanism provided by an API. Thus, we imple-
mented an app on iOS to transmit iBeacons and used the nRF
Connect for Mobile app to monitor these beacons. This worked
whenever the app was in the foreground of the iOS device. The
transmission was, however, discontinued, whenever the app
was sent into the background. As a consequence, we imple-
mented an alternative approach using the standard Bluetooth
Low Energy (BLE) protocol. A corresponding app was written
for iOS and and another one for Android. Both apps implement
the beacon transmission and beacon monitoring. The source
code can be downloaded from https://github.com/danielgnt.
The subdirectories bletrack-android and bletrack-ios contain
the associated code. These apps could successfully monitor
beacons between Android phones as well as between iOS and
Android phones. All associated trials worked with the apps
in the background on both phones. However, we could not
get the iOS to iOS scenario working with both apps in the
background. It only works when one of the apps is in the
foreground, which is not sufficient. If this could be solved, a
large community of programmers could implement the tracing
system described above.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The present paper exposes an automated, privacy preserving,
tracing method based on Bluetooth radio contacts, which
consequently works indoors, where people come closest to
each other. The approach uses random daily identifiers to
trace contacts. The randomness and daily updates prevent most
attacks on privacy. The information needed to trace contacts is
maintained locally in the personal device. The health agency
“Gesundheitsamt” is a trusted authority, which only stores
contact profiles of positively tested people. This data does not
have to include any means of identification of physical person.
The next step in bringing this approach to reality would be
to setup a task force force designing the details of the protocol,
as well as implementing and testing the mobile and server
components. The aim should be for a quick and stable initial
operational systems. The outcome should be further optimized
in a second phase to improve contact classification in order to
reduce unnecessary testing and quarantining.
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